Anvil and Hammer

Bill Arkin, former Greenpeace researcher but genuine friend of the truth in military affairs, tells it like it was.

The "pause," as I've written before, was not a pause. The drive to An Najaf put the anvil in place; airpower formed the hammer and even during the sandstorms, was pounding the Republican Guard and the Iraqi Army into dust.

Monk

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 2003

Fliers Rose To Occasion
In Iraq, a pause refreshed ground troops and let planes inflict major damage
By William M. Arkin

SOUTH POMFRET, Vt. - "Speed kills."

That's a military axiom Gen. Tommy Franks is fond of quoting. And it has become the favored explanation for our military victory in Iraq: the high-speed drive of American ground forces straight to the heart of Saddam Hussein's power in Baghdad.

Since the war lasted only 21 days, that assessment may seem hard to argue with. And, since the lessons of the latest war are used to fight the next budget battle in Washington, the conclusions that "speed kills" and fast-moving ground forces bring victory could have an effect on what kinds of forces the United States has at its disposal next time.

Before we close the book on lessons learned in Iraq, however, decision-makers should look again at what happened. Beyond question, the Iraq war laid to rest the tempting notion that heavy ground forces no longer have a central role to play in 21st century warfare.

But a close examination of the sequence of events suggests that - despite Franks' favorite axiom - at a critical juncture in the invasion, it was not the forward "speed" of those ground troops that killed. It was "the pause."

Remember the pause? For nearly a week, Army and Marine tanks, infantry and artillery units had hurtled across Iraq at unprecedented speed. During its historic race through the desert, the Army's 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) moved 310 miles in its first three days on the road. Then, for five days in March, near the Shiite holy city of Najaf, the breakneck advance slowed to a crawl, as troops pulled up to await much-needed supplies and to ride out a hellacious three-day sandstorm. At the same time, the Army was dealing with unexpectedly troublesome attacks by snipers and the Fedayeen Saddam.

It was this pause that killed. And the killing came from air power, in an unremitting assault by Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and British Royal Air Force planes against Hussein's most formidable ground forces. As a result, before the 3rd Infantry Division's tanks engaged a single Republican Guardsman of the Medina Division 11 days into the war, the unit considered Hussein's strongest had been pounded into oblivion.

"I find it interesting when folks say we're softening them up," Lt. Gen. T. Michael "Buzz" Moseley, who commanded the air war, said during the first week in April. "We're not softening them up. We're killing them."

In that sense, in terms of overall military operations, there was no "pause." Ground forces might have slowed their forward rush, resupplied their units and made other adjustments before pressing on again, but the air war only intensified. "There should have been some embedded reporters with the Republican Guards," quipped Brig. Gen. Allen Peck of Moseley's command center. They would have reported that "there was no operational pause."

Franks' plan called for the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division to bypass populated areas and the military forces around them in order to reach the Iraqi capital quickly. Franks rejected the Desert Storm model of protracted bombing before a ground war. His plan sent Army troops and Marines on their wild ride to Baghdad simultaneously with the start of bombing.

Planners at Central Command wanted to cut by half through air attacks the combat effectiveness of the Medina Division, which was deployed near Baghdad, before American ground forces reached it. Air power was to be supplemented and eventually supplanted by artillery, rocket and helicopter strikes before tanks and infantry engaged Iraqi forces on the ground. Franks' original timeline, according to prewar briefings, had ground forces in Baghdad on Day 10.

Things did not work out quite that way - fortuitously, as it turned out. Iraqi resistance damaged Army attack helicopters, and the 3rd Division slowed its advance to wait for its follow-on unit, the 101st Airborne Division, as well as for supplies. The weather also played a role.

But through air power, the time was put to good use, not only by redirecting strike sorties but also through the use of all-weather weapons. "We have the flexibility to be able to refocus additional air power" by using weapons "not hampered by the weather," Maj. Gen. Victor E. Renuart Jr., who was Franks' director of operations, told reporters March 25, six days into the war. Two months before the war started, the Medina Division had begun moving out of its Tigris River barracks at Suwayrah and into positions in the Euphrates River valley south of Baghdad. Military intelligence considered the Medina to be Iraq's best- equipped heavy unit.

With the 3rd Division slowing to a crawl and with Iraq's notorious sandstorms raging, Hussein's commanders thought they saw an opening. In reality, it was Moseley who got the opening.

"There may have been a sense in Iraqi forces that this was an opportunity," said Maj. Gen. Daniel Leaf, who was Moseley's representative at ground forces headquarters. Under the supposed cover of bad weather, Iraqi reinforcements began moving south. The Medina Division repositioned against the 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry of the 3rd Infantry Division. Officers said the squadron was virtually surrounded at one point.

But the Iraqi opportunity was a fatal illusion.

As the Iraqis broke cover, the U.S. air commander unloaded on them. Around the clock, hundreds of precision-guided weapons struck individual trench lines, vehicles and artillery guns. Then came the "dumb" bombs as B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers started to deliver enormous loads: In just a week, the proportion of precision-guided weapons dropped from more than 90% to about 70%. More than 1,100 cluster bombs were dropped. It was not just a question of more weapons. Leaf said a natural learning curve increased the efficiency of attacks. As communications improved, pilots and spotters learned the lay of the land. Procedures became second nature. And U.S. air units reacted more quickly and effectively.

As a result, radar and other surveillance systems impervious to weather provided precise targeting information on the location of Iraqi armor and vehicles. Special operations teams that had infiltrated the area earlier gave the bombers further assistance.

"We have gotten very, very good in our ability to put air power precisely on target in short order," Gen. Peck said.

But, he added, "we still need to figure out what it is we did."

Peck was referring to the problem of assessing bomb damage. The switch from laser-guided bombs, which were not optimal for use in bad weather, to predominantly satellite-guided and dumb bombs had the unintended effect of making damage evaluation far more difficult, since they lack the gun cameras used in targeting that make it possible to watch laser-guided weapons explode.

For several days, commanders were in the dark about how effective the air attacks had been. The sandstorm broke March 27, but the 3rd Infantry Division's attack on the Medina Division was delayed for two additional days. "We knew that the Medina was getting pounded," a senior military officer said. "We just didn't know how much."

As it turned out, after the weather cleared and intelligence officers could assess the Iraqi division's condition, they concluded its combat effectiveness had plunged to a mere 20%. Officers involved in directing and assessing the air war have nothing but praise for the 3rd Infantry Division and other ground forces. Peck spoke of the synergistic effect of air and ground combatants operating together. "Ground troops forced the enemy's hand," he said. "If they massed, air power could kill them. If they scattered they would get cut through by the ground forces."

The air attacks on the Medina and other divisions south of Baghdad in the two weeks leading up to the final assault on Saddam International Airport not only destroyed the bulk of the heavy organized resistance but also helped make the job of the 3rd Infantry and 1st Marines easier once they assaulted the capital. As a result of the "pause" and its round-the-clock air attacks, the 3rd Infantry at least went into its final push with minimal casualties and with a decimated foe.

In modern warfare, playing well with others is a necessity. To win a war so lopsidedly, ground and air forces, U.S., British, and Australian special operations forces, as well as the intelligence community, had to work together. Sure, there was service culture to contend with - even some parochialism - but no one openly pressed selfish interests for the glory of an individual service. As the story of what happened in the crucial days before the final ground assault on Baghdad shows, it was this overriding commitment to joint operations that brought success to American arms and saved American lives.

That lesson, demonstrated in war, must not be lost in peace - in the budget and policy battles yet to come. The trick in warfare, as Leaf put it, is "not to focus on what was last, but focus on what is next."

William M. Arkin is a military affairs analyst who writes regularly for Opinion.